Contemporary efforts to adjust state finance plans for differences in teacher salaries are, at best, premature.
Teachers' Salaries and Finance Equity by C. Thomas Holmes and Kenneth M. Matthews
Finding appropriale ways of adjusting s tate finance plans to compensate lor differences In the costs of educa· tional resources has been a persislent problem. Because differences in the salaries of teachers are considered to be the dominant source of differences among districts in the costs of resources, contemporary research focuses o n ways of determining the cost of teachers. This artic le will briefly examine prominent efforts to arrive at teacher cost indices to illustrate the complexity of the problem and idenll fy major areas of disagreement among researchers. Salary determination practices will be examined and impli· cations for finance equity will be discussed.
The Cost of Teachers Local costs of living, supply of and demand tor teach · ers, and wages in local industries have been advocated as bases for deriving teacher cos! indices. Altho ugh each of these approaches appears to be logical, none has proven adequate.
Costs of Living
The intial cost adjustments in Florida were based on differences among districts in the local costs of living.
• Fox charged that this method was inadequate because " ... it focuses on the cost of living within districts ralher lhan the cost of living of teachers .... It focuses on poinl o f employment, not point of expenditure, and these two poinls do not coi ncide .... this technique seems to be a device to channel funds into districts which contain wealthy residents." ' Matthews and Brown examined changes in Consumer Price Indices and changes in begin· ning teachers' salaries In eighteen standard metropolitan statistical areas and found relative change in Consumer Price Indices to be" ... an unreliable indicator of concurrent changes In beginning teacher salaries and an ineffi-C. Thomas Holmes is assistant professor and Kenneth M. Matthews is associate professor, Department of Educational Administration, University of Georgia, Athens.
Winter/Spring, 1984 cienl predictor of future salaries."' Thus, even though adjustments based on local costs of living have strong emo· tional appeal, the empirical base supporting them has not been established.
Supply and Demand
Supply and demand approaches are based on the as· sumption that teachers' salaries reflect the strength of the desire of local officials to employ quality teachers and al· feet the supply of teachers. The arguments against the use of the economic concept of supply and demand are numerous.
A major argument against the use of supply and demand approaches is that the supply of teachers is not highly elastic. Matthews and Holmes asserled thal the supply of teachers that may be assumed to be mobile Is dominated by !hose entering the profession .' If this assertion is correct, then supply and demand approaches would logically be li mited to beginn ing teachers. If not, the error may be substantial. According to Stiefel and Berne, the use of beginning teachers' salaries results in teacher cost indices that are one-third to o ne-half as large as when average teachers' salaries are used. ' A second argument against supply and demand ap· preaches is the disagreemenl among researchers as to what data are appropriate proxies for supply and demand factors. For example, Matthews and Brown challenged Chambers' use of average daily pupil allendance, the cost of land and housing, the degree of urbanlzalion, popula· lion density, the population of the county, and the dis· lance of the county from the nearest central city as proxies for supply and demand factors.' Wenlzler argued that district family income level could be classified as a dis· trict amenity or a district disamenity.' As an amen ity, higher Income areas would presumedly attract applicants. As a disamenity, higher income areas are assumed to re· duce the number of teaching applicants. (The same logic holds for the cost of land and housing .) Wenlzl.ir also questioned the u. se of pupil counts in computing teacher cost indices.•
Local Industry Wages
Gensemer reasoned that hig h wages in local industries have a negative effect on the supply of teachers.
• The direct application of his logic to the computation of teacher cost ind ices is questionable because of his finding that the differential in classified personnel salaries between high wage areas and low wage areas was more than twice as great as for the salaries of certificaled person · nel." Although he used per capita personal income in· stead of local industrial wages, Matthews found a nega· tive relationship between changes in local income levels and changes in beginning teachers' salaries In metropolitan areas." An alternate to Gensemer's logic is that high local industrial wages may increase the supply of reacher applicants because of lhe opportunities for employment for family members who are not trained as teachers.
As pointed out in the brief discussion above, conlemporary efforts to compute teacher cost indices have not been universally accepted." Part of the reason for the level of disagreement that exists can be linked to the ab· sence of credible teacher salary determ ination theory. An examination of recent data supports the our contention that adjustments to state finance plans based on differences In teachers' salaries are, at best, premature.
Salary Determination Practices
The importance attached by superintendents and school board members to the salaries paid teachers in other d istricts is often clearly demonstrated when local officials choose to study their compensatory systems. A recent request for proposals from a large Louisiana school system included the following requ irement:
" A review of salary data pertinent to the development of a salary compensation program must be conducted as a basis for understanding the relationships between employee salaries within the district and ... similar salaries paid in the Standard Metropol itan Statistical Area (SMSA) within which the district is located, and other similar school districts' salaries." " A Georgia school system was even more specific naming the d istric ts with which it wanted to be compared, d.h.:
"The consultant will survey the 13 school districis in the Metro-... area to obtain comparative data on sal· aries and supplements. (These systems are .... )"" Because school systems are apparently interested in the salaries being paid in neighboring districts, a metropolitan area was selected for a case study.
Salary schedules were obtained from thirteen school districts within one Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). These data were subsequently plotted to show relationsh ips among the salaries of teachers in the selected districts. Figure 1 represents the annual salaries paid by the selected districts to teachers holding master's degree certification.
As can readily be seen from the figure, the thirteen districts have divided themselves into three distinct groups with respect to the salaries paid to teachers. We have chosen to label the higher paying group, composed of dis· tricts 1, 2, and 3, the "competit ive elite." The middle group or "normalizers" consists of districts 4 through 9 and the bottom group or "laggards" is composed of districts 10through 13.
The Competitive Elite
If the curves representing salaries paid in districts 1, 2, and 3 are studied closely, evidence of policy decisions in the districts become evident. The three districts have salary schedules, based on different philosophies, that al· low each superintendent to' claim the highest salaries in the area. 1 -~ Central office personnel in District 3 have designed a schedule in which all step raises are g iven in the fi rst ten years of service. From the ti me a teacher is tenured through thirteen years of experience, the superintendent in this district can claim to be paying the highest salaries. Obviously an attempt is being made to attract the best young teachers in the market. Local officials apparently believe the relatively high salaries being paid to younger teachers will discourage them from relocating, and that after fourteen years of service within the district, the teach· ers are not likely to leave the system before retirement.
Officials In Dis tric t 2 have chosen to give somewhat smaller increases per year of experience than District 3 but to give credit for more years of experience. It appears that the leaders In this district have decided to attempt to keep their more experienced teachers and to vie for the services of other experienced teachers. The result of this decision is that the superintendent of District 2 can claim the highest salaries in the metropolitan area for teachers with fou rteen through twenty-six years of experience.
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Officials in District 1 have made a policy decision to reward extended service within the system. This decision is reflected in the salary curve in Figure 1 , as well as In of· ficial policies. (e.g., District 1 will only award one-half credit for any t~ach ing or administrative experience prior to being employed in District 1.) After twenty-four years of experience, the salaries in District 1 catch up to the sala· ries being paid In District 2. After twenty-seven years of experience the teachers' salaries in District 2 are higher than in any other d istric t within the SMSA.
The Normalizers
The largest group of districts is that where salaries are close to, or at, the mean salaries in the area. For various reasons (they don't believe they need to, they don't believe they can afford to, and so forth) officials In these d istric ts have made pol icy decisions not to compete with the competitive elite in terms of teachers' salaries. In fact, in one of these districts the school board has adopted a policy that it will pay salaries at the average for the area. On close inspection, the six salary curves representing these districts reveal the same kind of status maneuvering within this group as was observed within the competitive elite.
The Laggards
This group of four districts is composed of those where salaries for the more experienced teachers fall sub· stantially below those of the competitive elite and normalizers. It is interesting to note, however, that even these districts offer salaries that are reasonably competitive lor beginning teachers with master's degrees. Thus it appears that competition for beginning teachers is stronger than competition for the services of highly experienced teachers.
Revenue Potential
In an earlier study of the salaries of beginning teachers with bachelor's degrees in Florida's sixty-seven school d istricts, Matthews and Holmes found that the revenue-generating potential per pupil of local districts had a significant effect on local salaries. Those with sala· ries above that predicted from the mean beginning sala· ries in contiguous d istricts were significantly more likely to have greater revenue potential than those whose sala· ries were lower than predicted."
In an attempt to replicate the results of the Florida study, Spearman Rho correlation coefficients were calculated with the data for the thirteen districts. The districts were ranked in order from the highest nonexempt assessed property valuation per pupil in average daily attendance to the lowest." In addition, the districts were ranked on the salaries they were paying teachers at each of four certification levels, first with no years of experience and again at the maximum number of years of experience. The results of the correlations between rank in property wealth per pupil and salaries are reported in Table 1 .
At the maximum experience end of the salary sched· ules, there is a high positive relationship between teach· ers' salaries and reven ue potential. In fact, approximatel y sixty-five percent of the variation in the teachers' salaries Is associated with the variation in assessed valuation per pupil In average dally attendance. Salaries paid beginning teachers with a certificate based on a bachelor's degree, however, correlate only moderately high with assessed valuation. It appears that local officials feel a need to compete as much as possible for beginning teachers and this com· petition is only somewhat moderated by available rev· enue. Toward the higher end of the scales. the amount of revenue moderates the competition more and seems to become a highly significant determinant of teachers' sala· ries.
Educational Considerations
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Implications for Equity As stated earlier. the evidence indicates that contem· porary efforts to adjust state finance plans for differences in the salaries paid teachers are, at best, pre'mature. If, as demonstrated in the Florida study, districts with higher revenue·generating potential pay higher salaries, then glv· Ing districts with high teachers' salaries more revenue ap· 9 pears to be illogical. If given more revenue, the data indicate distric ts would pay teachers higher salaries. Subsequent studies of the cost or teachers would show those districts currently having hi gh teacher cos t Indices to have even hig her indices following the receipt o f add itional revenue. Thus, a cyclic closed system would be in operation. Higher salaries generate more revenue and greater revenue generates higher salaries which generate more reven ue and so on.
Finance equi ty dictates that differences in the q uality of education among dis tric ts Is no t to be a func tion of the wealth of the d istric ts. With differences in the cost of ed u· cational resources dominated by differences in the salaries of teachers and the salaries of teachers strongly affected by district wealth, cost adjustments can, and are likely to, contribute to a reduction in fi nance equity. 
